Russias Approach to Cyber Warfare

Russias Approach to Cyber Warfare Policy Briefing on the Imminent Russian Cybersecurity Threat: The Need For Action Against Russian Cybercrimes In recent years, Russia has found a reliance on using cyberwar and crimes as a tactic to achieve their strategic goals both in their near-abroad and against Western countries. The United States must be prepared to retaliate against any cyber attack directed at our nation by assessing options to limit and counter the Russians without leading to an overescalation and possible war. Background: The frequency with which we hear about Russian hackers hacking into a country’s important information and systems has become more and more regular, and as a result of this it is important to trace back the history of Russian cyber warfare. The first instance of a large scale Russian cyber attack happened in Estonia in 2007. At the time, tensions were high between Russia and the former Soviet State, and the Kremlin authorized a campaign which targeted Estonian governmental agencies and businesses through use of massive DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks that shut down countless websites essential to the functioning of these agencies and businesses (Batashvili). In 2008, Russia coordinated an even larger cyber attack during the Russo- Georgian War. On August 7, a cyber attack was conducted from Russia against Georgian government and media websites, while at the same time Russian troops were crossing the Georgian border. According to the Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, the attack lead to several Georgian servers and high amounts Internet traffic being taken control of and placed under external control (Batashvili). The offensive persisted through the conflict lasting until ceasefire was announced on August 12. Furthermore, the Kremlin had tested their abilities in the lead up to the invasion, shutting down the official website of the president of Georgia for an entire day on July 10. The Russian cyber attacks affected practically all Georgian government websites, crippling the state’s ability to respond to the conflict. Additionally, attacks targeted Georgian media, business, and other political organizations in order to control them from turning the conflict away from Russia’s favor by making it difficult for information of what was happening inside of the conflict zone to spread out to the rest of the world. According to a report by the US Cyber Consequences Unit, â€Å"the primary objective of the cyber campaign was to support the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the cyber attacks fit neatly into the invasion plan†. The attacks achieved their intent, since they â€Å"significantly impeded the ability of the Georgian government to deal with the Russian invasion by interfering with communications between the government and the public, stopping many payments and financial transactions, and causing confusion about what was happening† (US Cyber Crimes Unit). Recent cyber attacks against Ukraine are a worrying signal of a continued use of this strategy. Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko said that during in the final two months of 2016, Ukrainian state institutions had 6,500 instances of hacking, most directed towards the ministries of defence and finance, in addition to Kiev’s power grid and the treasury. According to the Poroshenko, the operation came at the hand of the Russian security services, following the same playbook as they had in Georgia (Batashvili). Russian cyber operations are not use solely in tandem with military offensives however, with many also being employed in the wars on information, especially against Western nations. The 2016 American presidential election, while highly publicized is not the only instance in which there is evidence of Russian interference with the 2017 French and German elections also being targeted. Numerous French officials and agencies, including the Defense Minister and DGSE have raised concern over the issue of Russian interference in the nation’s election, citing concern that fake news and cyber attacks were being directed to now President Macron and his party as they were not the candidates the Kremlin believed would be most beneficial to the Russian state interests. German intelligence agencies have also brought up similar concerns about Russian cyber activities being directed against Germany and its election, with Chancellor Angela Merkel, herself seeing attacks as threatening the foundation of German democracy and the effective functioning of the German state (Delker). Russian Objectives: As practiced today, Russian use of cyberwarfare has three common and consistent objectives: Capturing Territory Without Resorting to Overt or Conventional Military Force This was the strategic goal we saw Russia trying to achieve in 2014, when they successfully annexed Crimea. The annexation of Crimea relied on a group of Russian Special Forces operatives known as the â€Å"little green men†, who took their directives from a newly created Russian special operations command. The deployment of these highly trained operatives, in coordination with a massive information warfare campaign, as well as the involvement of   local Russian loyalist proxies created the opportunity for Russia to takeover without needing to shed blood as they had forced momentum to shift in their favor allowing for Crimeans in Ukraine to vote for secession from Ukraine (Chivis). In 2008, Russia used similar tactics in its invasion of Georgia, during which they similarly coordinated cyber attacks against essential government computing services while simultaneously operating special operation forces in coordination with Russian loyalists from the Georgian State. A major impact of these tactics has led to a weakened ability to integrate these countries with Western thought. In 2013, Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov showed Russia’s current views on such hybrid cyber warfare tactics, stating that in modern conflicts non-military means are put to use more than 4 times as often than are conventional military operations (Gerasimov). This suggests in the future such cyber attacks will be likely, and even at this point many are not being properly identified. In its use of cyberspace, Russia has shown it can find success in achieving territorial expansion goals in a manner that is nonviolent and seemingly peaceful, however there is always the underlying threat of actual military force being used unsparingly. Creating a Pretext for Overt, Conventional Military Action In a similar manner to capturing territory through covert, non-militarial expansion, Russia is also capable of using cyber warfare in order to create a conflict which gives them solid reasoning to use military force in foreign nations (Chivis). For instance, the Russian annexation of Crimea has lead to a reasonable concern that the Kremlin could engage in a hybrid strategy to manufacture a conflict worthy of military action elsewhere, possibly the Baltic states. As it did in Crimea, Russia could try to create tension in a country like Estonia by conducting a campaign which foments discord between the minority Russian population and the Estonians. In creating these sentiments which portray the government of Estonia as oppressive towards the minority Russians, the Kremlin can justify a Russian military intervention their behalf of the Russian minority, as Russian sentiment still sees these people as their own. Conducting an operation of this sort requires the accompaniment of simultaneous cyber operations directed at inflaming attitudes and creating difficulties in executing both national and NATO responses. It would almost certainly be accompanied by efforts to influence broader European and world opinion in ways that favored Russia’s intervention through use of propaganda and opinion shifting which portrays Russia as acting on behalf of a repressed population that seeks its aid. On the ground, it would involve the use of Russian secret agents and proxies, both to act as aid/support for local populations creating tensions, and to coordinate with military forces awaiting instruction and guidance. Using Hybrid Measures to Influence the Politics and Policies of Countries in the West and Elsewhere This last objective is the most pressing for the United States and Western countries out of the near vicinity of Russia. In this objective, the Kremlin seeks to use cyber operations in lieu of military action or war to create tension and distress in Western governments. The goal of this strategy is to influence and create favorable political outcomes in targeted countries to serve Russia’s national interests (Chivis). The countries where these types of operations are most likely to find success are those with high levels of corruption and weak legal systems. However, more stable countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom are similarly susceptible to such operations. Examples of ways the Kremlin can engage in cyber operations to influence an outside nation’s political system include the use of fake â€Å"troll† accounts used on social media to spread propaganda and create divides amongst the citizens of that nation. Also the hacking of servers of government officials can provide them with material which they can use to either influence that official through blackmail, or which can be leaked to induce further tension. In creating these narratives, Russia has the ability to influence democracy by planting false information and manufacturing biases against those that act against the interests of the Kremlin. American Stakes: The continued use of cyber attacks by the Russian government brings up very realistic threats both domestically and internationally for the United States. Internationally as Russia continues with their their goals of territorial expansion, the United States is faced with the concern of a wider influence of Russian thought and expansion of pro-Russian policies in areas where the United States has worked to promote democracy and peace. The desire of Russia to reassemble the Soviet Union remains very real, and as seen in Estonia, Georgia, and Crimea cyber attacks can play a key role in these territorial gains. By allowing continued expansion of the Russian state, the United States risks losing the strategic relationships they have developed with these countries as well as the progress they made towards finding them more independence from Russia as democracy began to take its roots in these nations. Furthermore, these attacks can be used by Russia in places like Syria as a way to promote the Assad regime which works in coordination with Russia in achieving other strategic goals, such as the development of an oil pipeline through Syria. Domestically, Russian cyber attacks can destabilize the US government by creating rifts and tensions amongst the American populace through the spread of false information and fake news.   As seen by the hacks against the DNC as well as the use of trolls during the 2016 Presidential Election, Russia’s use of cyber attacks can undermine American democracy by allowing for a foreign nation to alter the minds of our citizens, feeding them lies and inflammatory material to create disarray in our democracy. This is especially hurtful as Russia can cite American disorder as a reason to not take our example and implement democracy in the American fashion to foreign nations. Attacks by Russia can also cripple the government’s ability to function towards the service of its citizens.   Government Organization for a Cyber Attack The 2016 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41 United States Cyber Incident Coordination   defines a significant cyber attack as â€Å"likely to result in demonstrable harm to national security interests, foreign relations, the domestic and global economy, public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and the safety of the American people.† (PPD 41). Cyber attacks by Russia against domestic communication or critical IT infrastructure fall under this classification. Should such an attack actually occur, the National Cyber Response Group would lead the defensive response as an arm of the National Security Council (PPD 41). The Secretary of Defense, in tandem with the directors of our Intelligence agencies would be responsible for managing incoming threats, and coordinating any strategy or movement that would require active military response. In the event that the telecommunications systems of the National Security and Emergency Preparedness sector fail, the National Coordinating Center for Communications would be tasked with re-establishing communications. Furthermore, PPD 41 stipulates that if an operation with clear attribution is found to have occured, the Cyber Response Group shall assemble a team of qualified and skilled cyber personnel to respond to the cyber incident. This response team shall have experience together in the form of practice sessions and war games. U.S. Strategic Responses After addressing the immediate effects of a Russian cyber attack, it’s imperative the United States consider its options of strategic and tactical responses. One option for the United States is response through non-military means such as indictment, diplomacy, or sanctions (Bate). A lower-level military and intelligence strategy that could possibly be employed by the United States is the use of counter-surveillance intelligence operations,   non-attributable cyber or conventional attacks, or attributable cyber or conventional attacks (Herb). These operations would target Russian military, civilian, or critical infrastructure systems. Since NATO classifies cyberspace as the fifth operational domain, it is likely that if the United States identified a significant cyber incident against its citizens as originating from Russia, their response would come in the form of aggressive cyber tactics. The possibility of conventional military expeditions may be explored, however the risk of further escalation makes it more likely that the United States respond only through cyber operations. Low-Level Attributable Cyber Intrusion One possible response the United States could utilize in retaliation to Russian cyber attacks is low-level cyber intrusion, distributed across a array of cyber incidents that could not be collectively categorized as a major attack. This intrusion would appear as a result of what is called â€Å"loud cyber weapons†, which are tools that can be traced back to the U.S military (Herb). The US military would send these weapons, embedded with encrypted codes, into Russian networks. The United States would then publicly provide the encryption key to end the intrusions caused by these weapons as a way to claim responsibility for the attack. The purpose of taking credit for the attacks is a key paradigm shift in U.S military strategy, now emphasizing attribution as a key aspect of a successful operation, and public knowledge as vital for deterrence. The United States also has the option of conducting more basic cyber attacks against Russia’s network, including by not limited to: alteration of government websites, disruptions of Internet service, interferences and disablements of communications, or the spreading of propaganda (Department of Defense Law of War Manual). In the aftermath of the hack of the DNC, senior officials weighed options for counter attacks on the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Intelligence Agency (GRU), including the use of the NSA’s TreasureMap tool, which tracks all global connections to the Internet, and can be utilized to install malware in targeted Russian computer systems with the purpose of intelligence gathering and future cyber-assaults (Bamford). Medium-Level Cyber Attack -No Immediate Casualties   The United States also has to ability to employ the use of â€Å"logic bombs† in cyber operations targeting both military and non-military targets in Russia. â€Å"Logic bomb† are codes developed with the purpose of overloading a computer’s system rendering them incapable to operate by presenting them with an endless amount of logic questions to answer. Sending these â€Å"logic bombs† into computer systems critical to Russia’s infrastructure will lead to the United States causing dramatic economic and operational damages to the Russian government and its people (Sternstein). The United States has invested a large sum of money into the development of these â€Å"logic bombs†, with initial investment coming back in 2014 when U.S. Cyber Command offered a $460 million contract to develop a â€Å"computer code capable of killing adversaries.†(Storm). High-Level Cyber Attack – Possible Casualties The United States could use logic bombs or other cyber intrusion methods to attack Russian critical infrastructure in a more serious fashion, leading to a larger potential for loss of human life or safety. These attacks include targeting systems such as those of a dam above a populated level where a   hacking could lead to floodgates being opened onto Russian citizens, or disabling air traffic control services leading to air safety where planes pose a threat to each other and the land beneath them. These options, particularly if they are easily traceable, have the potential to escalate quickly into further intensified conflict. Military-Level Cyber Attack – Escalatory The United States also has the ability to use similar cyber operations to directly attack Russian military targets, with possible targets including the shut off of power at a nuclear facility or an airfield, which will lead to the cause of serious casualties. These attacks will most definitely lead to a triggering of a notable escalatory threshold of response by the Russians. It is significant that many Russian industrial networks run computer systems operating Windows XP, and in some cases even older systems, while maintaining connections to the Internet. Not only are these dated systems particularly vulnerable to attack, as evidenced by the United States already demonstrating its ability to break into these systems. In November 2016, the United States reportedly penetrated Russian military systems, leaving behind malware to be activated in retaliation in the case of Russian interference of U.S. elections (Dilanian et. al). This demonstrated both confidence in the success of the malware implant, and political willingness to trigger a consequential conflict given Russia attacks the United States in a serious manner (Bernish). Strategic Considerations for U.S. Decisions In response to a Russian cyber attack, the United State’s strategic responses should be a result of its classification of the attack as being non-significant, significant, or an act of war. State Department Cyber Coordinator Chris Painter said the United States would respond to incidents on a case-by-case basis in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Information Technology and National Security in November 2016, saying that retaliation â€Å"could be through cyber means. It could be through diplomacy. It could be through indictments and law enforcement actions.†(Pellerin). Some of these responses require action while others do not; the path taken must be dependent on actual and anticipated effects of a cyber attack, including damage, injury, and death. Painter testified that, â€Å"cyber activities may in certain circumstances constitute an armed attack that triggers our inherent right to self-defense as recognized by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter†(Hearing on â€Å"Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation†). The United States could also identify a cyberattack as being an infringement upon its territorial integrity and political independence, per Article 2(4) of the Charter. However, recent political happenings indicate that the United States would be hesitant in invoking Article 51, regardless of whether a Russian cyber attack lead to nominal death, injury, or damage. Instead, the United States could limit its declarations and address the attack as a â€Å"significant cyber incident,† invoking the full support of the U.S. military while avoiding over-escalation. Furthermore, even though NATO justifies military response in the realm of cyberspace, the lack of precedent means that the United States actually has more options in responding to Russia if it were to employ use of cyber means, that may or may not lead to conventional consequences. The United States would need to decide between conducting a covert or overt counter-cyber attack. The tactical considerations noted above show that hidden, non-attributable cyber attacks do not fall within the Department of Defense’s deterrence strategy, and would not be treated as a suitable strategy. In the aftermath of the 2014 Sony Pictures hacking by the North Korean government, the United States didn’t respond with a public cyber operation, and it was â€Å"unclear how the United States may have retaliated against the North in secret, if it even did so.†(Sanger). The lack of a publicly noticed retaliation as well mild economic sanctions now seems ineffective as punishment. A situation could come up that would give the United States the opportunity to execute an immediately observable cyber attack or a preparatory attack (logic bomb), with the target being either a Russian military or civilian infrastructure. Similar to Russia, the United States should also avoid directly targeting a military structure in order to avoid escalation to full-scale war. As a result of this, the United States should choose to deploy a cyber weapon against critical Russian infrastructure, leading to conventional consequences being faced by Russia. Even the use a medium-level choice in terms of retaliation, would require global ramifications to be taken into account. Even still, it is my recommendation to engage in a retaliatory strategy, which employs the use of both a combination of an observable cyber attack through use of â€Å"loud cyber weapons† and â€Å"logic bombs† against significant parts of the Russian infrastructure. The United States cannot allow Russia to attack them and take global credit for the attack without retaliating in some way to show dominance over Russia. â€Å"Loud cyber weapons† are particularly suitable for retaliation that the public is aware of and will show the world that the United States is not only willing to retaliate, but is better skilled in cyber war and confident enough in its abilities to retaliate swiftly. â€Å"Logic bombs† targeted against non-military sites that still hold significant value to Russian infrastructure will be the second leg of the suggested attack. The crippling of essential infrastructure will both warn the Russians that an attack on us will be met with an attack that hurts their citizens and keep them from being able to retaliate back since they will not have the resources to come back at the United States. Works Cited Batashvili, David. â€Å"Russias Cyber War: Past, Present, and Future.† EUobserver, 15 Feb. 2017, euobserver.com/opinion/136909. Delker, Janosch. â€Å"Germany Fears Russia Stole Information to Disrupt Election.† POLITICO, POLITICO, 28 Jan. 2018, www.politico.eu/article/hacked-information-bomb-under-germanys-election/. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on February 5, 2010 (translated). Accessed at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ 2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf. Understanding Russian â€Å"Hybrid Warfare† and What Can Be Done About It (2017) (testimony of Christopher S. Chivvis). Print. US Cyber Consequences Unit. (2009) ‘Overview by the US-CCU of the cyber campaign against Georgia in August of 2008’ Valery Gerasimov, â€Å"The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand   Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,† Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, February 26, 2013.

Driving Test Essay -- essays research papers

I woke up at eight in the morning, being that it was May and spring was in the air I knew that my day would be perfect. As I leaped out of my warm and comfortable bed to put on my Bullwinkle slippers, my stomach nerves began to tighten. I figured it was just a small bellyache and I would get over it soon. I walked slowly to the bathroom not really realizing that the house was not filled with sunshine as it usually is during these beautiful spring days. As I began to brush my teeth my eyes caught a glimpse of the window that I now noticed was so close to the mirror. I could have died when I noticed that the rain was coming down like a storm. It was at that moment that I ran to mother’s room to tell her that I couldn’t go driving today. My whole body was tense, I knew this was a sign for me to stay home, I was scared and would never be able to drive in the horrible storm. I don’t know how, but she convinced me to just try, â€Å"It’s just a driving test,â €  is what she continued to repeat, â€Å"if you fail, your not ready.† I knew she wanted me to fail anyway. As she drove into the driveway that seemed to be the size of a football field, my stomach nerves began to tighten once again. There were a few cars in front of us forming a line, and three cars pulled up behind us as soon as the car stopped. I sat in the passenger’s seat watching a car on the winding trail, looking as if it was going back and forth on the course. It seemed as everything that was happening at that moment was irritating me, the tapping of the rain on the car, the windshield wipers swishing back and forth on the windshield and the whining of the saxophone that was playing along with the jazz song on the radio. I knew that my patience was being tested that day and I was sure I would fail. For the next ten minutes I watched as the instructors, that looked as if someone dropped a bucket of water on them even with the yellow raincoats, left one car that was on the course to get into another car that was on the line. The cars seemed to move quickly and it seemed as if my turn was coming to quick. It was at that moment that I felt like I wanted to cry, the wet figure in the yellow raincoat was approaching our car. I wanted to scream for my mother to turn around but I was stuck in the moment I didn’t know what to do. My mother called me and it reminded me of summer nights when she would call me to come in ... ...ualities as he kindly explained that I should relax and adjust my car seat to make me more comfortable. He stressed to me to take my time as I was preparing to drive so I wouldn’t be uptight. He then handed me the piece of paper, the same one he scribbled on the whole time I was driving, and told me to make an appointment to take the test over again. I then watched as the medium framed man got out of the car and walked to the next car on line. When my mother returned to the car, yes I cried, but she made me feel better by promising ice cream and saying that I would definitely pass the next time. On the drive home we blamed everything for the failure, the weather, my nerves, the test trail and even her insistence. I thought that my life was over without a driver’s license. I started at that moment to strategize and decide how I would take the test next time. I would be much calmer whether the sun was shining in the eighty-five degree weather or the snow was coming down in minus twenty. I knew that I wasn’t ready a, but I figured it still wasn’t a waste of time because I was able to take the valuable advice that the instructor gave me that day and even apply it to my next test.

African Americans health disparities Essay

In 2011, the diagnosis rate for HIV cases in the United States was 15. 8 per 100,000 population and 60. 4 among Blacks. Of 197,090 diagnoses of HIV-infection from 2008- 2011, Blacks/African Americans accounted for: ?47% OF THE TOTAL ?64% OF WOMEN ?66% OF INFECTIONS ATTRIBUTED TO HETEROSEXUAL CONTACT ?67% OF CHILDREN, AGES < 13 In 2010, the death rate for blacks was higher (25. 0 per 100,000) compared with any other racial ethnicity group (3. 0 whites). Blacks represented 49% of all deaths with HIV in 2010. A recent study showed that blacks diagnosed with HIV are less likely than other groups to be linked to care, retained in care, receive antiretroviral treatment and achieve adequate viral suppression. African American Males African American men accounted for 42% of HIV cases diagnosed among men in 2011. A majority (72%) of African American men with HIV contracted the disease by male to male contact while 19% contracted HIV through heterosexual exposure. African American Females Among African American women, high risk heterosexual contact was the most frequently cited mode of transmission, accounting for 89% of cases diagnosed in 2011. More Information: ?HIV/AIDS TOPIC SITE ?HIV/AIDS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS ?HIV/AIDS STATISTICS AND SURVEILLANCE Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STD) Gonorrhea In 2010, 69% of all reported cases of gonorrhea occurred among blacks. The rate of gonorrhea among blacks in 2010 was 432. 5 cases per 100,000 population, which was 18. 7 times the rate among whites (23. 1). This disparity has changed little in recent years. This disparity was larger for black men (22.2 times) than for black women (16. 2 times). Chlamydia In 2010, the overall rate among blacks in the United States was 1,167. 5 cases per 100,000, a 4. 0% increase from the 2009 rate of 1,122. 2 cases per 100,000. The rate of chlamydia among black women was over seven times the rate among white women (1,536. 5 and 205. 1 per 100,000 women, respectively). The chlamydia rate among black men was almost 11 times the rate among white men (761. 8 and 69. 9 cases per 100,000 men, respectively). Syphilis.

Critically discuss to what extent Porter’s Diamond Essay

Critically discuss to what extent Porter’s Diamond is a useful concept in explaining home and host location strategies of international business? Illustrate your answer with reference to at least two case companies. The main aim of International business is to build and sustain competitiveness for economic value creation in both domestic and overseas markets (Besanko et al. 2007). Internalization business theory however has a variety of models that can identify the environmental analysis of specific countries. These models are used for companies to internationalize and find the right location(s) overseas by taking; institutional, cultural fit and success opportunities into consideration. These models also give in-depth information on locations that the companies have chosen. A very well-known framework is the Porter’s Diamond which was found by Michael Porter in 1990. This report will discuss the advantages and disadvantages to determine a company’s home and host location decision by analyzing two high street retailers – French E.Leclerc and UK’s Sainsbury’s. Porter’s Diamond Model (1990: 73 ) states that nation’s competiveness depends on the capa city of its industry to innovate and upgrade this however depends on the productivity level of the nation. From a company’s point of view a national competitive advantage means that it would have to depend on the nation to implement a home base to improve their existing products and services such as; technology, features, quality as well as being able to compete with international industries. Therefore, the advantage of this model is that it identifies the four factors that develop the essential national environment where companies are born, grow and as mentioned above sustain competitive advantage (Porter, 1990:78). The idea of this model is useful because it allows organizations to carry out the necessary research and identify which countries would be good enough to internationalize. As you can see from the Porters Diamond diagram the first factor is the factor condition, this factor is about production such as land, raw materials, capital infrastructure etc. these are not inherited, but developed and improved by a nation for instance skilled labor (Porter, 1990:79). In order to sustain competitive advantage it will depend on the factor creation ability. For instance, E. Leclerc started as a small rented warehouse â€Å"Leclerc established a chain of outlets across the country, single-handedly changing  the landscape of shopping in France†(www.independent.co.uk) â€Å"Critical evaluation of development and role of Balanced Scorecard in production and service organizations† Excerpts from HBR-1 (1992): â€Å"The Balanced Scorecard – Measures That Drive Performance,† Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, Harvard Business Review, January-February 1992, pg 71-79. Page 76-77: †¦ Analog Devices, a Massachusetts-based manufacturer of specialized semiconductors, expects managers to improve their customer and internal business process performance continuously. The company estimates specific rates of improvement for on-time delivery, cycle time, defect rate, and yield. †¦ †¦Over the three-year period between 1987 and 1990, a NYSE electronics company made an order-of-magnitude improvement in quality and on-time delivery performance. Outgoing defect rate dropped from 500 parts per million to 50, on-time delivery improved from 70% to 96%, and yield jumped from 26% to 51 %. Did these breakthrough improvements in quality, productivity, and customer service provide substantial benefits to the company? Unfortunately not. During the same three-year period, the company’s financial results showed little improvement, and its stock price plummeted to one-third of its July 1987 value. The considerable improvements in manufacturing capabilities had not been translated into increased profitability. Slow releases of new products and a failure to expand marketing to new and perhaps more demanding customers prevented the company from realizing the benefits of its manufacturing achievements. The operational achievements were real, but the company had failed to capitalize on them. †¦ Excerpts from HBR-2 (1993): â€Å"Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work,† Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, Harvard Business Review, September-October, 1993, pg 134-147. Page 142: †¦ Analog Devices, a semiconductor company, served as the prototype for the balanced scorecard and now uses it each year to update the targets and goals for division managers. Jerry Fishman, president of Analog, said, â€Å"At the  beginning, the scorecard drove significant and considerable change. It still does when we focus attention on particular areas, such as the gross margins on new products. But its main impact today is to help sustain programs that our people have been working on for years.† Recently, the company has been attempting to integrate the scorecard metrics with hoshin planning, a procedure that concentrates an entire company on achieving one or two key objectives each year. Analog’s hoshin objectives have included customer service and new product development, for which measures already exist on the company’s scorecard. †¦ Excerpted from JMAR (1998): Innovation Action Research: Creating New Management Theory and Practice, Robert S. Kaplan, Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 10, 1998, pg. 89-118. Page 99-101 â€Å"†¦For the balanced scorecard, the initial idea also came somewhat serendipitously, but also not completely by accident. The need for improved performance measurement systems had been widely recognized during the 1980s. Many articles, books and conferences documented the limita ­tions of relying solely on financial signals for improving business perform ­ance. The adoption of total quality management, just‑in‑time production systems and synchronous manufacturing all created a demand for im ­proved performance measures that would support companies’ continuous improvement initiatives. Therefore, much work had already occurred by 1990, the time when the balanced scorecard concept initially emerged (Berliner and Brimson 1987; Howell et al. 1987; Kaplan 1990b). Much of the need for improved operational performance measurements had been satisfied by measures such as part‑per‑million defect rates, yields, cost of nonconformance, process cy cle times, manufacturing cycle effectiveness, throughput times, customer satisfaction, customer complaints and em ­ployee satisfaction. What remained missing was a theory for how the myr ­iad of nonfinancial performance measures now being used on the factory floor could be reconciled with and achieve comparable status to the finan ­cial measures that still dominated the agenda of senior company executives. Fortunately (again), a skilled practitioner, Arthur Schneiderman of Analog Devices, contacted me to assist his company with launching an activity-based costing project. In our initial  conversation, I learned that he had developed an innovative approach, the half-life system, to measure the rate of improvement of his company’s TQM program. As part of my research agenda (see step 1 in exhibit 1), I asked for and received approval to visit Analog Devices and write a case about their initiatives. During my visit, I learned that Schneiderman had also developed and implemented a corporate scorecard that senior executives were using to evaluate the company’s overall performance and rate-of-improvement . The corporate scorecard included, in addition to several traditional financial measures, some metrics on customer performance (principally operational measures related to lead times and on time delivery), internal processes (yield, quality and cost) and new product development (innovation). This corporate scorecard, evolved, as we shall see, into what came to be called the balanced scorecard. †¦ †¦ by teaching the Analog Devices case to executives, I learned quickly that Analog’s corporate scorecard was of much more interest to them than the half-life method, the original focus of the case. †¦ †¦ even more initial learning came from testing the ideas directly with a set of companies that participated in a yearlong project on performance measurement with the Nolan, Norton & Co. The project attracted senior financial and planning executives from a dozen companies who met on a bi-monthly basis throughout 1990. Analog’s corporate scorecard captured the interest of the participants. Throughout the year, they experimented with it in their organizations and reported back to us on the results. The concept proved successful in many of the pilot sites and turned out to be the prime output from the year-long research project. In the process, the original corporate scorecard, which focused mostly on operational improvements (on lead times, delivery performance, manufacturing quality and cycle times) had become transformed into a much more strategic organizational performance measurement system, characterized by four identifiable perspectives (financial, customer, internal business process and innovation and growth). †¦ Page 109: †¦ The balanced scorecard implementations being done at the end of 1995, as integrated strategic management systems, were far more advanced than the initial formulation, as a complementary nonfinancial measurement system, at Analog Devices or the companies described in our initial article (Kaplan and  Norton 1992). In six years (1990-1995), Norton and I had made three cycles around the knowledge creation cycle. The half-life of improvement of the balanced scorecard knowledge base was much shorter than for activity-based costing. †¦

Louis XIV And His Foreign Policy essays

Louis XIV And His Foreign Policy essays Louis XIV (1638-1715), was known as the 'Sun King'. By the time Louis took up the reign of the government in 1660, France had turned into the most powerful nation of Europe. At this time many of France's neighboring countries had been weakened both by revolts within their own countries and expensive wars with other lands. In Louis's mind, the natural boundaries of France were the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the river Rhine. His intentions were to push the frontiers of France out to these limits as well as win glory for himself. As a result Louis plunged France into 30 years of foreign wars trying to achieve his ambition. This paper discusses Louis' XIV's foreign policy and analyzes whether his foreign policy was successful or not. Louis XIV's notorious dictum was "I am the State". Even the late Charles De Gaulle often echoed this. Louis XIV (1638-1715) - king of France (1643-1715) - was known as the 'Sun King'. Louis, the third monarch of the Bourbon family, ruled for 72 years, the longest reign in European history. His rule typified the period of absolute monarchy in the second half of the 17th century, during which time kings ruled without the restraint of representative institutions. This epoch is widely known as the age of Louis XIV because other European monarchs imitated and competed with developments Coming to power at a young age, Louis did not have the conventional humanist education of most princes, who learned Latin, ancient history, rhetoric, and the arts. Instead his instruction focused on the practical necessities of kingship, such as the history of France and its monarchy and After Louis XIV came to the throne just before his fifth birthday, the Italian-born first minister Cardinal Mazarin guided the policies and effectively instructed Louis in affairs of state both internal as well as foreign affairs.. When Mazarin died in 1661, Louis proclaimed that he would ...

Mixed-gender sports Term Paper Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1750 words

Mixed-gender sports - Term Paper Example In the past women had no opportunity or even a chance to improve and develop their bodies. It was not preferable for women. Now the situation has changed and women took part in the competitions, but the amount of them is much less than the amount of men. It would take much time to improve the situation (Bryant, 2003, 140). Feminist movements made many attempts in order to gain the same rights and conditions for women. Only at the end of the 20th century the world saw the results. The sport was not considered to be a male privilege and from that moment women received the opportunity to participate in almost every kind of sport. For sure we cannot say that the full equality has not been achieved and now feminists turned their attention to the problem of segregation (Bryson 350). At first sight in the world of sport the segregation does not provoke any disputes; it is just accepted by its participants. And there are a number of reasons for that. Due to the physical peculiarities, women have less opportunity to demonstrate their skills. The trouble is that sex segregation in sports seriously influences not only the issue of discrimination in sports circles, but also on the sexual hierarchy in the society in general. So, this issue is very important and worth-discussing as it refers not only to sport but to the everyday life as well. Mixed-gender sports could help defend the rights of women, so it must be introduced as much as it is possible. There is an opinion that the main aim of feminists concerning sport is to get rid of men, especially in those kinds of sports where women suffer from men’s athleticism. To say more such evidence as gender segregation in the team sport is accepted by both women and men. The basis for such statement is the myth that men have privileges over women, because they are stronger from the birth. So, gender segregation in the field of sport contributes to the common belief that women and men belong to the different worlds. Now man y scholars is concerned with the issue what role the gender plays in sport and how it influences the position of women in the modern world. In order to find the answer to this question it is enough to recall the participants of different kinds of sport. Just remember the Olympic Games, where women and men have different competitions. People can explain it due to different physical abilities and as a result women usually compete with women and men with men. An interesting thing was noticed during the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. The German team had different colors of jackets for women and men and it looked like the indicators of gender that automatically demonstrated the differences between them (Bryant, 2003). And here the important question arises if such separation takes part in professional sport and if the professional sport tries to emphasize the differences between men and women. According to the official sources a great number of sports are gender-segregated at a p rofessional level. On the other hand, researches show that a great number of men already recognize that women as athletic as they are. Anderson came to the following conclusion in his research: â€Å"thus, in the sex-integrated sport of collegiate cheerleading, even once sexist and misogynistic men were able to witness the athleticism of women, befriend them in

Maisie is representative of her class (the working poor) and gender Essay

Maisie is representative of her class (the working poor) and gender. Discuss the effects of WWI on the class system and on women, in particular - Essay Example One of the ways in which Maisie Dobbs represents the working class poor is by having a history and identity that totally correlates with the working class poor. Particularly, Maisie Dobbs hails from a poor background. Alongside this, Maisie becomes less fortunate as she loses her mother her mother at her pubescent stage of life. To show for this poverty and underprivileged status, Dobbs has to work to supplement her father’s efforts. In fact, the matter is graver since this means that Dobbs is being exploited, since she is a minor yet she is employed. This is not so uncommon among low income earners or the working class poor societies which may not mind their underage children being conscripted into child labor, to supplement their meager earnings (Winspear, 12). Likewise, Dobbs represents the working class poor by landing a lowly job as maid at Lady Rowan Compton’s Belgravia Mansion, in 1910. Mostly, it is the working class poor which cannot discriminate against jobs that come their way, because of prevailing antecedent factors such as previous inability to access quality education. This means that in the long run, the working class poor subculture cannot produce favorable qualifications to help them attain meaningful jobs. Dobbs also represents the working class poor by taking education seriously. The working class poor takes education seriously because it sees it as the only conduit by which it can become empowered and scale upwards in the society. High income earners and the upper middle class may mostly not take learning as seriously as the working class poor, since the two classes are privileged to have several options. The seriousness that Dobbs expends in her learning is seen in her being filled with the joy of reading and learning when she is introduced to Lady Compton’s library. Dobbs also gladly and willingly becomes Maurice Blanche’s